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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Research Question
I examine the consequences of a random exposure to common risk for the use and empirical
measurement of relative performance evaluation (henceforth RPE). Agency theory recom-
mends RPE to shield agents against the compensation risk arising from the volatility of risk
factors beyond their control. Considering the agent’s action as a random parameter of the
underlying performance distribution, an optimal RPE contract aggregates measures of firm
performance and common risk so that the combined performance signal is a more informa-
tive measure of the agent’s action than the raw measure of firm performance. Evaluating
the agent on the basis of an optimally aggregated performance measure improves the risk
sharing between principal and agent to the benefit of firm owners (Holmstrom 1979, 1982).
Compared to its theoretical benefits, the evidence on the use of RPE is scant. This ap-
parent contradiction between theory and practice has spurred a large body of theoretical and
empirical research. In an attempt to solve the so called RPE puzzle (Murphy 1999) theorists
have considered various extensions of the basic agency model to rationalize the scarce use
of RPE. Diﬀerent from the present paper, these studies typically consider settings where
RPE also serves other purposes than evaluating the agent’s performance (e.g. Aggarwal
and Samwick 1999, Garvey and Milbourn 2003, Gopalan et al. 2010). At the same time,
empiricists have used refined research designs (Albuquerque 2009, 2014) and newly available
data (Gong et al. 2011) to shed light on the factors determining the (lack of the) use of
RPE.1
In this paper, I study the consequences of an important practical diﬃculty that con-
strains the implementation of RPE in real world compensation contracts but has so far been
overlooked in the academic debate, namely the randomness of firms’ exposure to common
risk. As I will argue and demonstrate in more detail below, a random exposure to common
risk factors limits the ability to remove the impact of these factors from measures of firm
performance. The resulting exposure risk not only makes RPE less useful than suggested
by the standard agency model but it also impedes the empirical identification of RPE in
1See section 2 for a detailed review and discussion of the related literature.
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cases where firms optimally remove the measurable part of common risk from their own
performance.
To illustrate the problem, consider a slightly modified example of an oil producer proposed
by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) to demonstrate the seemingly obvious benefits of
removing the impact of observable random factors from measures of firm performance. The
firm’s profit is a linear function of the random oil price e, so that e = +  · e+e, where 
is the unobservable contribution of the firm’s manager, e is the firm’s idiosyncratic risk, and
 is the marginal exposure of the firm’s performance to changes in the oil price.2 If  is a
known constant, it is easy to construct a net performance measure e = e−  · e = +e that
provides the same eﬀort incentives but shields the manager from the risk of oil price changes.
Suppose now, that  depends on the firm’s production quantity and that the quantity is also
random.3 Let e take two values e ∈ { } with arbitrary positive probabilities. Since the
true value of e is not known at the time the contract is written, the agent’s compensation
will inevitably depend on the oil price even if the firm evaluates the agent on the basis of
the aggregate performance measure e = e−[e] · e that removes the expected impact of the
oil price from the firm’s performance.4
1.2 Research Design and Key Results
To explore the implications of a random exposure to common risk for the practice and
empirical measurement of RPE, I consider the problem of finding linear aggregates of firm
performance and informative but uncontrollable measures of common risk. As in Holmstrom
(1982), firm performance is a linear function of the agent’s eﬀort, common and idiosyncratic
risk. However, diﬀerent from previous literature, the marginal exposure to common risk
is not a constant but a random variable. This seemingly marginal change of a standard
2Throughout the paper a “∼” indicates a random variable, whereas the same letter without a “∼” above
denotes its realization.
3An unknown production quantity is only one of many possible factors that could cause a random exposure
to common risk. For example, it is well know from the asset pricing literature that beta factors exhibit a
significant level of volatility (e.g. Jagannathan and Wang 1996, Fama and French 1997, or Lewellen and
Nagel 2006). See section 3 for a detailed discussion and further examples.
4Let (e) denote the agent’s compensation function, since e = e+(e−[e]) · e and e 6= [e] the agent’s
compensation is a function of e
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assumption in the basic RPE model has important consequences for the aggregation of
performance measures.
Even with multivariate normality of all random variables, the standard solution methods
for the aggregation problem proposed in the literature cannot be applied because aggregate
performance measures no longer satisfy the necessary distributional assumptions.5 To deal
with this problem, I derive aggregate performance measures as best linear predictors of firm
performance given the information contained in the available measures of common risk. This
statistical solution approach has several advantages. First, it replicates the relevant results
found in the literature for a constant common risk exposure. Second, it provides a clear
benchmark for studying the consequences of exposure risk for the empirical measurement of
RPE. Third, it can be reconciled with an optimal contracting approach albeit under some
restrictive conditions.
Using this methodology, I derive linear aggregation rules for the performance of a focal
firm with three diﬀerent signal structures that cover the common problem settings considered
in previous literature. The first case examines the problem of filtering firm performance for
an observable factor of common risk in order to avoid reward for luck (henceforth RFL).
The second case considers the aggregation of firm performance with a single noisy measure
of common risk, and the third case considers the construction of a customized peer group
and its weight in the aggregate performance index. Unless stated otherwise, I refer to all of
these problems as special cases of RPE.6
In all cases, the randomness of the common risk exposure aﬀects the covariance structure
of performance measures. Most importantly, it increases the variance of a given performance
measure by a constant term that I coin exposure risk. This term is an increasing function of
the exposure variance and the variance and expectation of common risk. Since the exposure
5Prior studies of RPE require that performance measures are either jointly normal or that the joint
distribution belongs to a particular class of exponential distributions as specified in Banker and Datar
(1989). See section 4 for a detailed discussion of existing solutions to the aggregation problem.
6Previous literature distinguishes two forms of control for common risk. If common risk factors are not
directly observable but other firms are exposed to the same risks, the literature refers to RPE (Holmstrom
1982). In contrast, if common risk factors are directly measurable, such as the oil price in the introductory
example, the literature refers to the lack of RPE as reward for luck (RFL) despite the fact that the failure to
implement this recommendation could also penalize agents for bad luck (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001).
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risk contained in a given performance measure cannot be eliminated or reduced by RPE, it
adds to the idiosyncratic risk contained in the performance signal and makes it less useful
for the control of common risk.
My analysis of aggregation rules yields the following results: First, I find that the ran-
dom exposure to common risk precludes the perfect filtering of observable random factors.
Moreover, since the firm’s own exposure risk is not reduced by the use of RPE, the resulting
variance reduction is smaller than in the standard case of a constant exposure to common
risk. This observation holds for all three signal structures studied in this paper. Second, I
find that the optimal weight on a noisy measure of common risk is mainly determined by the
exposure risk contained in the performance signal. Third, I find that the relative weights of
peer firms within a customized peer index are monotonically decreasing in the peers’ expo-
sure risk. I also demonstrate that the weight of a peer index consisting of identical firms as in
Holmstrom (1982) is a decreasing function of the standardized exposure risk. Overall, these
observations suggest that the presence of exposure risk significantly reduces the relevance of
common risk measures for performance evaluation purposes.
To complement my theoretical analysis, I simulate two sets of regression models with
randomly generated data for the signal structures used in the theoretical part of the paper.
The first set of regressions explores how varying degrees of exposure risk aﬀect the statisti-
cal identification of relevant common risk measures. The results suggest that an increasing
exposure risk impairs the firms’ ability to determine the relevant set of performance mea-
sures and peer firms. Moreover, since the weights of individual peer firms are determined
simultaneously, the failure to identify a subset of relevant performance peers also biases the
weights put on properly identified peers.
In a second set of simulated regressions, I study how the random exposure to common risk
could aﬀect the correct empirical identification of RPE. I find that the presence of exposure
risk significantly increases the likelihood of a type II error in implicit RPE tests and gives
the wrong impression that firm using optimal aggregation rules fail to control for common
risk. I examine two potential empirical strategies for addressing this problem. In the first
test, I add a dummy variable identifying firms with an exposure risk above the sample mean
and find that this proxy significantly improves the correct identification of RPE provided
that the measurement of exposure risk is not too noisy. In a second test, I use a random
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coeﬃcient regression model as an indirect control for exposure risk at the firm level and find
that this method significantly reduces the likelihood of a type II error even if exposure risk
is high. These results suggest that the power of implicit RPE tests could be improved by
the use of appropriate controls for the magnitude of exposure risk at the firm level.
The contribution of my analysis to the RPE literature is threefold. First, I identify the
size of the exposure risk as a relevant factor for determining the aggregation of performance
measures and the composition of peer groups for RPE. Second, I provide a new explanation
for the limited use of RPE in the context of a model where its sole purpose is performance
evaluation. My findings might help to understand why recent research on the explicit use of
relative performance RPE in executive compensation contracts finds that a large majority
of firms do not use RPE in executive compensation contracts (Bannister and Newman 2003;
Gong et al. 2011). Third, my study provides a new reason for the limited predictive power
of implicit RPE tests and suggests two diﬀerent remedies for this problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the related
theoretical literature. Comprehensive summaries of the empirical literature can be found in
Albuquerque (2009) and Dikolli et al. (2013). Section 3 explains the model assumptions.
Section 4 reviews the existing benchmark solutions for the aggregation problem in the ab-
sence of exposure risk and derives the objective criterion for the aggregation of performance
measures in presence of exposure risk. Section 5 derives linear aggregation rules in presence
of exposure risk for three diﬀerent signal structures. Section 6 provides simulated regression
analyses based on the theoretical model and explores additional implications for empirical
research. Section 7 concludes the analysis with a summary of the main findings and some
suggestions for future research.
2 Related Literature
To my best knowledge, the present paper is the first to analyze the potential consequences
of exposure risk on RPE. In the appendix of a recent empirical paper, Albuquerque (2014)
sketches a related idea in the context of a LEN model. She assumes that the covariance
between firm performance e and peer performance e is a random variable that must be
estimated from observing a noisy signal e of the true covariance e. Without aﬀecting the
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variance of the performance measures, this approach can yield more or less RPE depending
on the signal realization .
Several other theoretical studies have proposed various theoretical arguments that could
explain RFL or the lack and/or limited use of RPE. For example, Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999) argue that firms in industries with a small number of competitors have an incentive to
put a positive weight on peer performance in order to soften product market competition and
show that this incentive can outweigh the potential benefits of RPE. Garvey and Milbourn
(2003) consider a setting where RPE takes the form of costly hedging a given market index.
In their model, the CEO and the firm can both hedge the market index at diﬀerent cost.
The optimal level of RPE depends on the relative magnitude of hedging costs and decreases
if hedging becomes relatively more costly for the firm.
Maug (2000) studies the relation between RPE and the agent’s own asset portfolio. He
shows that the manager optimally combines the assets in his portfolio so that he minimizes
his total compensation risk. Since an optimal RPE contract essentially achieves the same
objective in a world where the manager’s own trading activities are ignored, RPE becomes
redundant if the manager can optimally diversify his compensation risk by own trading
activities. Gopalan et al. (2010) study a model where the CEO decides on a firm’s exposure
to the performance of the industry sector in which it operates. Before deciding on the firm’s
exposure, the CEO can exert costly eﬀort to acquire a private signal about future sector
performance. To motivate the CEO’s eﬀort and exposure choices, the optimal contract is
positively related to sector performance. Finally, Fershtman et al. (2003) consider a model
where the agent derives additional utility from receiving a larger pay package than his peers
and find that the agent’s social preferences require that the optimal contract exhibits a
positive exposure to peer performance.
Other studies provide rational explanations for the presence of RFL in executive com-
pensation contracts as empirically documented in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and
Garvey and Milbourn (2006). For example, Göx (2008) shows that RFL can be an optimal
response to the million-dollar cap for the tax deductibility of non-performance-based pay in
Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code. In a related paper, Ferriozi (2011) studies
a binary limited liability model with post-contract-pre-decision information and shows that
RFL can improve the agent’s implicit incentives to avoid bankruptcy.
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Two recent theoretical studies provide potential explanations for the lack of empirical
support found in implicit tests of RPE. Dikolli et al. (2013) study the optimal composition
of a peer index in the context of a LEN model. They show that implicit tests of RPE are
potentially biased against finding support for the use of RPE if firms and empiricists use
diﬀerent aggregation rules for constructing the peer group. However, the authors only obtain
this result if they allow firms to depart from optimal aggregation rules. In a related study,
Dikolli et al. (2014) examine the consequences of CEO power on the optimal aggregation
of peer groups. Assuming that the CEO can use her power to set the weight on a given
peer index, they find that the resulting contract does not completely remove common risk
from the agent’s compensation. As a consequence, implicit RPE tests are unlikely to find
evidence for the optimal use of RPE.
3 Model
I consider the relative performance evaluation problem of a representative firm. A risk and
eﬀort-averse manager (the agent) runs the firm’s operations on behalf of a group of risk-
neutral firm owners (the principal). As in Holmstrom (1982), firm performance
 =  +  ·  +  (1)
is a linear function of the agent’s eﬀort  and the realizations of two independent random
variables e and e where [e] = 0 and [e]  0. There are  firms in the economy with
the output structure in (1). In what follows, I use the index  = 0 for the focal firm to
distinguish it from its peers.
The first random variable in (1), e is a common risk factor and  =  is the firm’s
(marginal) exposure to common risk. The common risk factor represents economic variables
that aﬀect the performance of all firms in the economy, such as input prices, foreign exchange
rates, interest rates, stock market conditions, and other factors determining the state of the
economy. The second random variable, e, is idiosyncratic and represents factors that aﬀect
the performance of firm  only. Examples for the second factor are the success of the firm’s
R&D activities, the eﬃciency of its production processes, or idiosyncratic shocks in product
demand.
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The fundamental diﬀerence between the two random factors for the purpose of incentive
contracting is the fact thate is not measurable whereas e can at least be measured with noise.
More specifically, I assume that there is a publicly observable signal e that is informative
about the common risk factor e but not controllable by the agent of the focal firm, i.e.
the distribution of e does not depend on 0. Since the agent is risk averse, the principal
has an interest to shield him from the compensation risk caused by the common risk factor
and to evaluate his performance relative to the realization of the informative signal e As
in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), I assume that the focal firm evaluates the agent on the
basis of a performance index that takes the form of a linear aggregation of realized firm
performance and the value of the signal about the common risk factor
0(0 ) = 0 −  ·  (2)
where  is the weight the focal firm puts on the realization of e
The key complication that distinguishes the present study from previous RPE models,
is the assumption that firm ’s marginal exposure to common risk, e is a random factor
on its own. This assumption is based on the well documented fact that firms’ exposure
to common risk appears to vary over time (Engle 2009). For example, the asset pricing
literature has found that firms’ exposure to market risk as measured by their beta factors
exhibits a significant level of volatility (e.g. Jagannathan and Wang 1996, Fama and French
1997, Lewellen and Nagel 2006, Ang and Chen 2007). Other studies find similar patterns
for the exposure of U.S. firms to foreign exchange-rate risk (e.g. Allayannis and Ihrig 2001,
Francis et al. 2008) or changes in commodity prices.7
Assuming a linear profit function, the exposure risk arises quite intuitively from the fact
that the firm’s profit basically sums up a number of mathematical products of (output and
input) prices and quantities. In many cases, prices and quantities are both random and
beyond the firm’s control, especially if firms act as price takers in their product and input
markets. As illustrated in the introductory example of an oil producer, this problem implies
that the firm’s revenues and cash receipts are primarily driven by the product of random
variables. Similar observations can be made for the food processing industry where raw
7Comprehensive online data on intertemporal correlation patterns of prices for various asset classes in-
cluding commodities is provided by The V-Lab (vlab.stern.nyu.edu) organized by The Volatility Institute at
NYU.
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material costs are an important cost factor and a key driver of product contribution margins.
Since the demand for food and input prices are both volatile and largely beyond the firms’
control, the profit of food and beverage manufacturers is to a large extent determined by the
product of random variables.8 These examples and the empirical evidence suggest that the
presence of exposure risk is rather the norm than the exception.
To allow for the volatility of the firm’s exposure to common risk, I model e as an
independent random variable with [e]  0. Since all random variables considered in
this study are mutually independent, the overall performance risk of firm  takes the form
(Goodman, 1960)
 [e] =  [e] +[e]2 ·  [e] +  [e] · ( [e] +[e]2) (3)
The expression in (3) comprises three terms. The first term,  [e], represents the idio-
syncratic part of firm risk. The second term, [e]2 · [e], is the risk caused by the firm’s
expected exposure to the common risk factor e. Finally, the third term in (3),
 =  [e] · ( [e] +[e]2) (4)
is the part of the overall firm risk caused by the randomness of the firm’s exposure to the
common risk factor. As indicated in the introduction, I subsequently refer to  as the
exposure risk of firm  to distinguish this part of the firm’s performance risk from the risk
caused by other factors.
It can be seen from the expression in (4) that the firm’s exposure risk is the product of
two factors. The first factor,  [e], is the variance of the firm’s exposure to e. The second
factor is the second raw moment of e, i.e. [e2] =  [e] +[e]2 Thus, the exposure risk
of firm  is not only increasing in the variance of firm ’s own exposure e but also in the
variance and the expectation of the common risk factor e. The higher the value of each of
these factors, the higher is the exposure risk of firm . In other words, the volatility of the
common risk factor and the volatility of firm ’s exposure to e are mutually reinforcing each
other in augmenting its overall exposure risk.
8As shown by Kerkvliet and Moﬀet (1991) and further illustrated by Aabo (2015), global manufacturers
face similar problems even if currency prices can be hedged since the randomness of sales prices and/or
quantities induces a hedge quantity risk that prevents perfect hedging.
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To analyze how the presence of exposure risk aﬀects the standard predictions of RPE
models, I derive linear aggregation rules for three diﬀerent signal structures that cover the
most common problem settings considered in the literature. The first case assumes that
the common risk factor is directly observable, such as foreign exchange rates or commodity
prices, so that
 =  (5)
The structure in (5) has been widely used as a benchmark model in studies analyzing the
phenomenon of RFL (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001, Garvey and Milbourn 2006). These
studies present evidence suggesting that CEO pay is (positively) related to observable ran-
dom factors beyond the CEO’s control. This observation contradicts the recommendation
of agency theory to evaluate the performance of the CEO net of the impact of observable
random factors. I also consider a second signal structure, where the signal itself is subject
to exposure risk and measurement error
 =  ·  +   6= 0 (6)
The structure in (6) allows me to distinguish a firm’s own exposure risk 0 from the exposure
risk  and the idiosyncratic risk embedded in the performance measure and to study the
consequences of each of these risk factors for the composition of the performance index in (2).
Finally, I consider a signal structure that has been frequently used in predicting the optimal
aggregation of peer groups into a peer index for the purpose of filtering common shocks that
aﬀect the performance of all firms in a given peer group (Holmstrom 1982, Dikolli et al.
2013). For this case,  takes the form of a weighted average of realized peer performance
 =P=1  ·  (7)
where  and  denote the index weight and the performance of peer firm  respectively,
and  is defined in (1). Since  is prone to measurement error and exposure risk, the
structure in (7) can also be interpreted as an extension of (6), i.e. a rule for filtering an
index of  imperfectly measurable random factors beyond the agent’s control.
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4 Linear aggregation of performance measures
To examine how the presence of exposure risk aﬀects the linear aggregation of performance
measures, I first review existing solutions to the aggregation problem and the conditions
under which they have been derived. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) provide a first solution
to the aggregation rule in (2). Assuming that e0 and e are jointly normal, they show that
the optimal weight on realized performance  within the performance index 0 equals9
 =  [e0 e] [e]  (8)
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) use the result in (8) to derive a theoretical prediction
for their empirical test of RFL in executive pay. In their model, 0 takes the form of (1)
and  =  as in (5). However, in contrast to the present study, Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2001) take 0 as a known constant. With these assumptions  [e0 e] = 0 ·  [e] and
 = 0 It follows that 0 = 0+ 0 so that the agent’s compensation does not depend on the
realized value of the observable random factor e
Holmstrom (1982) first considers the problem of aggregating multiple peers into a per-
formance index of the form given in (7). Assuming that  = 1 for all  and that e as well
as all idiosyncratic noise terms e are independent and normally distributed, he derives the
optimal aggregation rule
 =  P
=1    (9)
where   = 1 [e] is the precision of e Extending Holmstrom (1979), he shows that
the weighted average of peer firms in (9) is a suﬃcient statistic for the information contained
in the output vector  = (0  ) with respect to the agent’s eﬀort if 0 is considered as
a random parameter of the firm’s output distribution. More recently, Dikolli et al. (2013)
study a variation of Holmstrom’s RPE model where  is a firm specific constant and derive
the aggregation rule
 =  ·  P
=1  ·    (10)
9Banker and Datar (1989) derive the same result assuming a general agency model and a class of expo-
nential joint density functions (0 ; 0) with linear likelihood ratios. Among others, this class includes the
normal distribution as a special case.
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Diﬀerent from Holmstrom (1982), who finds his result in the context of a general agency
model, Dikolli et al. (2013) determine the aggregation rule in (10) in the context of a
LEN-model. Despite the diﬀerences in the model details, the results in (8), (9), and (10)
are all based on the convenient analytical properties of normally distributed (aggregate)
performance measures.
Unfortunately, this approach is not fruitful in the presence of exposure risk because the
performance measure in (1) contains the product of the two random variables e and e This
product is not normally distributed even if e and e follow a normal distribution.10 Therefore,
the performance evaluation problem in presence of exposure risk can neither be solved in
the context of a LEN-model, nor can it be found by a rearrangement of probability density
functions as in Holmstrom (1982).
To deal with this problem, I do not derive the aggregation rule in (2) from an optimal
contracting model but from a statistical objective criterion that yields the results in (8),
(9), and (10) without requiring normally distributed performance measures Since e is not
controllable but informative, its sole purpose is to improve the principal’s inference drawn
from a given realization of e on the realization of the common risk factor in e0. This statistical
measurement problem can be represented in terms of finding the best linear predictor (BLP)
for e0 given e. If e is a scalar, the BLP takes the form
(e) = 0 + 1 · e
where the parameters 0 and 1 minimize the mean square error[(e0−(e))2]. The solution
of this estimation problem is equivalent to the result of a linear population regression of e0
on e Moreover, given the linearity of the aggregation rule in (2), the BLP is equivalent to
the conditional expectation function [e0|e] (e.g. Goldberger, 1991, ch. 5; Amemiya 1994,
ch. 4). The following proposition defines the objective criterion for the case of multiple
signals and relates the result to the aggregation rules in (8), (9), and (10).
10As Craig (1936) and Epstein (1948) show, the product of two normally distributed random variables with
mean  and variance 2 takes the form of a Bessel function. As shown by Aroian (1947) and discussed in
further detail by Hayya and Ferrara (1972), this function can only be approximated by a normal distribution
if the ratios  approach infinity for both random variables. However, in the context of my model, this
feature is not a convenient assumption because it implies that the exposure risk is negligible.
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Proposition 1: Let e0 be a random variable and ey0 = (e1  e) the transpose of a n× 1
random vector with n×  covariance-matrix V and a n× 1 covariance vector d where
V =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
 [e1]   [e1 e]
...
. . .
...
 [e e1] · · ·  [e]
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ d =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
 [e0 e1]
...
 [e0 e]
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ 
With this structure, the BLP takes the form 0+β0·ey, where β0 = (1  ) is the transpose
of a n× 1 parameter vector satisfying
β = V−1d (11)
The aggregation rules in (8), (9), and (10) are special cases of (11) Proof: see appendix.
According to proposition 1, the BLP in (11) reproduces the results in (8), (9), and (10).
More importantly, since information on the structure of the covariance-matrix V and the
covariance vector d is suﬃcient to determine the BLP, a solution to the aggregation problem
can also be found if  is a random variable. This fact is particularly convenient for two
reasons: First, it permits to examine how the presence of exposure risk aﬀects the standard
rules for the linear aggregation of performance measures. Second, since the BLP can be
interpreted as the expected result of a linear population regression, it is an appropriate
benchmark for evaluating the consequences of exposure risk for the results of empirical RPE
studies. However, the convenient properties of the BLP do not imply that the aggregation
rule in (11) is generally part of the optimal solution of the underlying agency problem.
Corollary 1 identifies conditions for which the aggregation in (11) is consistent with the
optimal solution of the agency model.
Corollary 1: If the focal firm oﬀers the agent a linear compensation contract (0) = 0+
0 ·0 and the agent has mean variance-preferences  = [(e0)]−(0)−() · [(e0)]
as well as strictly convex eﬀort cost (0), the aggregation rule in (11) is part of the optimal
solution of the agency problem. Proof: see appendix.
Intuitively, corollary 1 relies on the fact that the BLP is found by minimizing the mean
square error. As shown in the appendix, this objective criterion can be reformulated in a
way that it is equivalent to the minimization of the variance of the performance measure,
 [e0] If the contract is linear and the agent has mean-variance preferences, the optimal
aggregation rule serves the same purpose, that is, the optimal weight  in (2) is set so that
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it minimizes the variance of the agent’s performance measure for an arbitrary eﬀort level
0. Therefore, the BLP optimally solves the agency problem under the conditions given in
corollary 1.
5 Linear aggregation with exposure risk
5.1 Filtering observable luck
I begin the analysis of the consequences of exposure risk for the linear aggregation of per-
formance measures with the simplest case in (5), where the realization of the common risk
factor is perfectly measurable. As explained in section 4, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)
employ this signal structure as a theoretical benchmark for their empirical RFL test. With
constant exposure to the common risk factor, the optimal aggregation rule sets the signal
weight in the performance index equal to the marginal exposure parameter ( = 0). The
corresponding aggregation rule in the presence of exposure risk is given in proposition 2.
Proposition 2: If the common risk factor is perfectly measurable, the aggregation rule in
(11) becomes
∗ = [e0] (12)
Proof: Since e0 and e are independent random variables  [e0 e] = [e0] ·  [e]
(Bohrnstedt and Goldberger, 1969). With this covariance, the BLP in (11) becomes (12).
Diﬀerent from the case of a know exposure to common risk, the aggregation rule in
(12) removes only the expected marginal exposure to the common risk factor e from the
performance measure in (2) even though the realization of e is perfectly observable. This
policy has important consequences for the accuracy of filtering performance measures for
observable random factors.
Corollary 2: The presence of exposure risk precludes the complete filtering of observable
luck. Proof: Substituting for  from (12) into (2) yields the aggregate performance index
0(∗) = 0 + 0 + (0 −[e0]) ·  (13)
The expression in (13) is a function of 
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According to Corollary 2, the aggregate firm performance varies with the realization of
the common risk factor e although the firm removes the expected impact of observable luck
from the performance index. The aggregate performance measure in (13) is only independent
of  if the realized exposure 0 happens to equal the expected exposure [e0] but this hairline
case is a zero probability event ex ante. Thus, depending on the value of the realized marginal
exposure 0 aggregate firm performance can either be positively (0  [e0]) or negatively
(0  [e0]) related to the realization of the common risk factor e.
In any case, the presence of exposure risk excludes a complete removal of the common
risk factor from the performance measure in (2). In fact, for a given eﬀort level 0, the
filtering rule in (12) reduces the total risk of the focal firm’s performance measure by the
expected contribution of the common risk factor to the firm’s overall performance risk,
 [e0]−  [e0(∗)] = [e0]2 ·  [e] (14)
Accordingly, the resulting variance of the aggregate performance measure in (13),
 [e0(∗)] =  [e0] +0 (15)
comprises the idiosyncratic performance risk and a second term, 0 =  [e0] ·[e2] rep-
resenting the firm’s own exposure risk as defined in (4). The expression in (15) indicates
that the optimal aggregation rule in (12) prevents the firm from removing its own exposure
risk from the agent’s performance measure. Thus, the randomness of the firm’s exposure
to the common risk factor essentially augments the undiversifiable part of the firm’s perfor-
mance risk and thereby makes the performance measure riskier as for the case of a constant
exposure to common risk.
5.2 Aggregating a noisy measure of common risk
In this subsection, I consider the aggregation rule for the second signal structure in (6),
where the common risk is not perfectly measurable. The signal structure in (6) exhibits two
diﬀerent distortions that prevent the firm from perfectly measuring the realized value of the
common risk factor e The first distortion is a standard measurement error represented by
the additive noise term e. The second distortion is the random exposure to the common
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risk factor embedded in the performance measure, represented by the random variable e
where  6= 0 The aggregation rule for this signal structure is given in proposition 3.
Proposition 3: If the common risk factor is imperfectly measurable, the aggregation rule in
(11) becomes
◦ = [e0] ·[e] ·  [e] [e] +[e]2 ·  [e] + (16)
where  =  [e] · ( [e] + [e]2)˙ is the exposure risk embedded in the performance
measure as defined in (4). The performance measure weight in (16) is decreasing in Rj,
 [e] and  [e] It is increasing in  [e] and [e0] The eﬀect of [e] is ambigu-
ous. Proof: see appendix.
A comparison of the aggregation rules in (12) and (16) shows that the presence of mea-
surement distortions embedded in the performance signal e can have a significant impact
on the aggregation of the performance index. Since  as well as the variances of e and e
increase the variance of e without aﬀecting the covariance between e0 and e, the optimal per-
formance measure weight ◦ is monotonically decreasing in   [e] and  [e]. Thus,
the additional risk factors embedded in the performance measure decrease the precision ofe and thereby reduce the relative usefulness of e for protecting the agent’s compensation
against variations of the common risk factor e.
For a given variance of the signal e its optimal weight in the aggregated performance
index is increasing in the expected exposure of the focal firm’s performance to the common
risk factor, [e0]. Intuitively, ◦ is positively related to the firm’s expected exposure to
common risk because an increasing exposure implies a higher covariance between e0 and e
and a higher covariance increases the usefulness of the performance signal e for reducing the
risk of the aggregate performance measure.
Unlike the other factors, a higher variance of the common risk factor e and an increase
of [e] positively aﬀect  [e0 e] and  [e] However, an increase of  [e] has a
positive net eﬀect on ◦ because for any given level of the ratio between the two measures
the relative increase of the numerator exceeds the relative change of the denominator.11 By
contrast, an increase of the signal’s expected exposure to the common risk factor, [e] can
11In fact, it holds that
 [e0 e]
 [e] ·  [e0 e]−1   (e) [e] ·  (e)−1
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reduce or increase ◦. The eﬀect is positive, whenever
 =  [e] +  [e]2 ·  [e] (17)
where  is the total error of e in measuring e. It comprises the idiosyncratic risk  [e]
and the exposure risk  contained in e. That is, whenever the expected contribution of
the common risk factor to the variance of e on the right hand side of (17) is smaller (larger)
than the total measurement error , an increase of [e] has a positive (negative) impact
on ◦.
Finally, it can be seen that the firm’s own exposure risk, 0, or equivalently  [e0]
does not aﬀect the aggregation rules in (12) and (16) because it is idiosyncratic to the
focal firm and independent of the weight placed on the performance measure e. Corollary
3 summarizes the overall eﬀect of the aggregation rule in (16) on the risk of the aggregated
performance measure e0(◦).
Corollary 3: If the common risk factor is imperfectly measurable, the optimal aggregation
rule reduces the risk of the performance measure by
 [e0]−  [e0(◦)] = [e0]2 ·  [e] · ◦ ◦ = [e]2 ·  [e] [e]  1 (18)
The risk reduction is strictly smaller than the risk reduction with a perfectly measurable
common risk factor in (14) and monotonically decreasing in  [e]. Proof: Follows from
the fact that  [e] =  +[e]2 ·  [e] and ◦ [e]  0
According to corollary 3, the presence of exposure risk and measurement error in the
performance signal e lowers its usefulness for reducing the variance of the performance index
and thereby its desirability for contracting. The higher the exposure risk and the higher the
measurement noise embedded in the performance signal, the lower the scaling factor ◦ in
(18) that determines the level of risk reduction relative to the benchmark case of a perfectly
measurable common risk factor in (14). The scaling factor ◦ has an intuitive interpretation.
It is defined as the ratio of the expected amount of common risk to the total risk contained
in the signal e and represents the expected percentage of common risk contained in the
performance measure. As shown in (3),  [e] is the sum of three factors: the expected
common risk, the idiosyncratic risk, and the exposure risk. Therefore, the scaling factor
◦ is increasing in the expected amount of common risk and decreasing in the amounts of
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idiosyncratic and exposure risk. The consequences of the last observation are summarized
below:
Corollary 4: If the exposure risk becomes very large, the signal weight ◦ in (17) and the
scaling factor ◦ in (18) both go to zero. Proof: It holds that →∞
◦ = →∞
◦ = 0
Thus, at the limit a substantial exposure risk can render the performance signal e useless
for shielding the agent’s compensation against common risk.
5.3 Aggregation of a peer index
The last case of my analysis considers the aggregation rule for the third signal structure in (7)
where the performance index e comprises a group of peer firms with a similar performance
structure. That is, the performance of each of the  potential peer firms is aﬀected by an
idiosyncratic shock e and each peer faces a random exposure to the common risk factor e
represented by the random variable e. The optimal composition of the peer index in (7) is
summarized in proposition 4.
Proposition 4: If the performance index comprises a weighted average of peer firms with
firm performance e as defined in (1), the optimal weight of firm j equals
+ = [e] · ()P
=1[e] · () (19)
where () = 1 is the total precision of the peer signal e in measuring e and  =
 (e) + as defined in (17).
The following observations can be made:
1) The optimal peer weight in (19) is increasing in [e] and () but it is decreasing in
[e] and () for  6= 
2) The optimal weight of peer j is monotonically decreasing in its own exposure risk. It
approaches zero as Rj approaches infinity.
Proof: see appendix.
A comparison of the aggregation rules in the absence and the presence of exposure risk
in (10) and (19) shows that in both cases the index weight of peer firm  is increasing in its
(expected) exposure and in its precision in measuring the peer’s exposure to the common
risk factor e However, since the signal precision in the presence of exposure risk, ()
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is decreasing in  a higher exposure risk reduces the usefulness of firm  for the purpose
of RPE. At the limit, if the exposure risk of firm  becomes very large, the firm’s optimal
weight in the peer index goes to zero. Likewise, for a given exposure and precision of peer
firm  an increase of the exposure and/or precision of other firms within the peer index
reduces the optimal weight of firm  The opposite is true for an increase in the exposure
risk of firm . Because () is decreasing in , a higher exposure risk of firm  increases
the optimal weight of all other firms in the performance index.
These considerations show that the exposure risk of peer firms is a critical factor in
determining their usefulness for the purpose of relative performance evaluation. The higher
the exposure risk of a potential peer firm, the lower its relevance for RPE and for the
composition of the peer index. Moreover, since the optimal index weight of each peer firm
depends on its own exposure risk as well as on the exposure risk of all other firms contained
in the performance index, a change of the exposure risk at one firm aﬀects the optimal
index weights of all other firms. Corollary 5 summarizes the impact of exposure risk on the
optimal weight of the peer group in the aggregate performance index and the variance of the
performance measure.
Corollary 5: With the peer index in (7) and the peer weights in (19), the optimal index
weight becomes
+ = [e0] ·  [e] ·P=1[e] · ()
1 +  [e] ·P=1[e]2 · ()  (20)
Using the index weight in (20) reduces the risk of the focal firm’s performance measure by
 [e0]−  [e0(+)] = [e0]2 ·  [e] · + + = +
1 + +  1 (21)
where + =  [e] ·P=1[e]2 · () The risk reduction is proportional to the scaling
factor + ∈ (◦ 1) and monotonically increasing in +. Proof: see appendix.
A comparison of the risk reductions achieved with a perfectly measurable common risk
factor and the peer index in (14) and (21) shows that the exposure risk contained in the
measure of peer performance significantly aﬀects the usefulness of the peer index in reducing
the focal firm’s compensation risk. Similar to ◦ in (18), the scaling factor + determines
the level of risk reduction relative to the benchmark case of a perfectly measurable common
risk factor in (14). Its size is determined by the factor + representing a weighted sum of
the expected common risks contained in the performance measures of the firms within the
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peer index. Using the definition of (), the contribution of firm  to the factor + can be
expressed as:
+ =  [e] ·[e]2 [e] + 
where + =P=1 +  Thus, + is the ratio of the expected common risk contained in e to the
sum of the idiosyncractic risk and the exposure risk in e. The higher the expected common
risk and the lower the idiosyncratic risk and the exposure risk, the higher is the incremental
contribution of peer firm  to the scaling factor + and thereby to the overall reduction of the
performance measure risk. Intuitively, a large expected exposure to common risk increases
the usefulness of firm  for RPE, whereas a high exposure risk reduces its desirability for
RPE.
To gain additional insights on the impact of the aggregate exposure risk on the optimal
level of RPE, assume that all peer firms face identically distributed risk factors. Withe = e e = e, and  = , the optimal index weight in (20) becomes
+ =  ·[e0] · [e] ·  [e] [e] +  ·[e]2 ·  [e] + (22)
A closer inspection of the expression in (22) shows two facts. First, for a given value of the
standardized exposure risk,  =  [e] · [e2] the usefulness of RPE is increasing in the
number of peer firms because +  0. Second, and more important, the standardized
exposure risk has a negative impact on the optimal weight of the performance index. The
second relation implies the following observation:
Corollary 6: If  approaches infinity, the optimal index weight in (22) approaches zero.
Proof: Evident from the structure of the expression in (22).
Thus, at an aggregate level, a high exposure risk can preclude the use of peer groups for
the purpose of relative performance evaluation.
6 Practical and empirical implications of exposure risk
6.1 Overview
The results of the theoretical analysis in section 5 indicate that the presence of exposure risk
can have a significant impact on the linear aggregation of performance measures. To illustrate
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the potential economic consequences of varying degrees of exposure risk and to provide
additional insights regarding the practical implementation of the theoretical solutions and
their implications for empirical research, this section provides two sets of simulation studies.
Section 6.2 shows a comprehensive set of firm level simulations for the three diﬀerent types
of performance measures analyzed in section 5. Section 6.3 extends the focus of the study
beyond the firm level and demonstrates how diﬀerent econometric designs aﬀect the empirical
identification of optimal aggregation policies in a heterogeneous firm sample.
6.2 Firm level analysis
To illustrate how varying degrees of exposure risk aﬀect a firm’s ability to filter observable
luck from its own performance, I first compare the results of six diﬀerent regressions of firm
performance 0 on common risk  Holding all else constant, each regression is performed on
1,000 random samples of 1,000 observations using parameters drawn from six diﬀerent dis-
tributions of the firm’s exposure to the common risk factor (e0). To isolate the consequences
of an increasing exposure risk from changes in other variables, I distinguish the distributions
by varying the standard deviation 0 from 0 (i.e. a constant exposure) to 12 as shown in
panel A of table 1.
[please insert table 1 about here]
Panel B shows the results of linear regressions of 0 on  for each of the six exposure
distributions shown in panel A. The first four rows report the summary statistics of the
estimated regression coeﬃcients of  In line with equation (12), the mean estimates are
close to [e0] = 1 for all 6 cases. However, as indicated by the standard deviations and the
range of the estimated regression coeﬃcients, exposure risk introduces a substantial degree
of variation among the regression coeﬃcients estimated for diﬀerent random samples.
More importantly, the distribution of -values in rows 5 and 6 as well as the share of
significant regression coeﬃcients in row 7 indicate that a high exposure risk decreases the
likelihood that a regression finds a statistically significant relation between firm performance
and common risk although both variables are correlated. In fact, for a constant exposure
(model 1) and a moderate exposure risk (model 2) the regression coeﬃcients are found to be
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significant at the 95% level for all random samples, whereas only 46.6% of the estimates for
the highest exposure risk (model 6) yield regression coeﬃcients that are significant at the
95% level. The summary statistics of 2 in rows 7 and 8 of panel B with mean values ranging
from 0.4997 (case 1) to 0.0055 (case 6) indicate that the variation in firm performance that
can be attributed to changes of the common risk factor is decreasing in the firm’s exposure
risk.
As a practical matter, these findings indicate that a high exposure risk might prevent
firms from filtering observable luck from their own performance. In the absence of precise
information on the theoretical distributions of e0 on e, firms must assess the potential re-
lation between firm performance and observable measures of common risk by means of a
regression model similar to the model used in the simulation. Accordingly, the presence of
exposure risk impedes the identification of a statistically significant relation between firm
performance and common risk. Likewise, exposure risk can render the filtering of observable
luck economically insignificant because a low 2 indicates a negligible reduction of the firm’s
overall performance risk.
Panel C provides the summary statistics of an additional test for the eﬃciency of the
optimal filtering rule proposed in equation (12). The test reports simulated regressions for
the aggregated performance measure 0(∗) in equation (13) on common risk  using the
data generated for the first test in panel B. The results indicate that exposure risk increases
the likelihood of finding a significant statistical relation between 0(∗) and  even though
the expected impact of common risk has been removed from the firm’s performance measure.
The shares of significant regression coeﬃcients at the 95 % level with exposure risk are in
the range between 14.3% (model 2) and to 18.2% (model 6) and significantly higher than in
the constant exposure case (model 1) with 5.7%. These findings suggest that the presence
of exposure risk increases substantially the likelihood of a type II error (a false rejection of
the hypothesis that the firm optimally filters for observable luck) in a compensation study
performed at the firm-level and lead to the wrong conclusion that the firm rewards their
executives for observable luck.12
[please insert table 2 about here]
12In fact, if the agent’s compensation (·) is a linear function of 0(∗) a regression of (·) on  will find
evidence for RFL.
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Table 2 shows equivalent simulation results for the problem of aggregating firm per-
formance and a noisy measure of common risk as studied in section 5.2. The simulation
compares the results of six diﬀerent regressions of firm performance 0 on a given measure
 of common risk . Since the optimal aggregation rule in (16) is not aﬀected by the focal
firm’s own exposure risk but by the exposure risk contained in the performance signal 
(henceforth "index exposure risk"), the standard deviation of e0 is held constant at 0 = 1.
To study the consequences of varying index exposure risk, I use the same simulation ap-
proach as in table 1 but allow the standard deviation of the index exposure, 1, to take 6
diﬀerent values ranging from 0 to 12.
The results of the second simulation are in line with those of the first in table 1. However,
since the optimal performance measure weight is negatively related to index exposure risk,
the mean values of the regression coeﬃcients are decreasing in 1 All other results are similar
to those found for varying degrees of the focal firm’s own exposure risk in panels B and C
of table 1. A higher index exposure risk increases the standard deviation and the range of
the regression coeﬃcients relative to the mean and thereby reduces the mean of the -values.
As a consequence, the share of regression coeﬃcients that are significant at the 95% level
drops from 100% in the absence of index exposure risk (model 1) to 26.2% for the highest
index exposure risk (model 6). The same trend can be observed for the distribution of the
2-values ranging from 0.1271 (model 1) to 0.0029 (model 6).
The additional regression of the aggregate performance measure 0(◦) on  reported in
panel C of table 2, yields similar results as the regression of 0(∗) and  reported in panel
C of table 1. An overall comparison of tables 1 and 2 suggests that, ceteris paribus, the
consequences of an increasing index exposure risk are similar to those of an increase in the
focal firm’s own exposure risk but most eﬀects found in table 2 are slightly more pronounced
than those reported in table 1.
[please insert tables 3 and 4 about here]
Tables 3 an 4 show a numerical example and related simulation results to study the
consequences of varying peer exposure risk for the aggregation of a peer index as analyzed
in section 5.3. Holding all other parameters constant, the example considers a sample of
ten potential peers with identically structured performance signals  but diﬀerent degrees
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of exposure risk. The exposure risk of peer   = 1 10 is determined by the standard
deviation  of its marginal exposure to common risk, e. To simplify notation, I let  = .
As a benchmark for the simulation reported in table 4, table 3 summarizes the theoreti-
cally optimal weights for the ten peer firms, +  and the index, + as defined in equations
(19) and (20), and compares the results to the optimal weights in the absence of exposure
risk. The optimal peer weights reported in the second row of table 3 illustrate the importance
of exposure risk for the composition of the peer index. The lower the peer exposure risk,
the higher the relative weight of a given peer firm within the aggregate performance index.
While the performance of the lowest exposure risk firm enters the peer group with a weight
of 56.53%, the firm with the highest exposure risk has a weight of 0.84% only. Multiplying
the relative weights with the optimal index weight of 0.3709 yields the eﬀective weight that
the focal firm puts on an individual peer firm relative to its own performance.
The comparison of the optimal weights with and without exposure risk in table 3 exhibits
significant diﬀerences for both the relative weights of individual peers and the aggregate peer
index. While the relative weights of individual peer firms are higher (lower) for peers with
low (high) exposure risk, the optimal index weight unambiguously declines by 49% from
0.7273 to 0.3709 due to the presence of exposure risk. Taken together, the example firm
optimally puts less eﬀective weights on all firms except for the firm with the lowest exposure
risk for which the eﬀective weight rises from 0.0727 to 0.2097. Overall, the comparison of
RPE policies in table 3 indicates that ignoring the presence of peer exposure risk can cause
a significant deviation from optimal aggregation rules.
Table 4 shows the summary statistics of 1,000 multiple regressions for simulated random
samples of focal firm and peer performance using the parameters of the example in table
3. The mean values of the regression coeﬃcients in the first row of table 4 are close to
the eﬀective peer weights reported in row 4 of table 3. However, as for a given peer index
in table 2, a higher peer exposure risk increases the standard deviation and the range of
the regression coeﬃcients relative to their mean. As a consequence, the mean -values are
significantly declining as the peer exposure risk increases. Likewise, the share of regression
coeﬃcients that are significant at the 95% level drops from 100% for the lowest peer exposure
risk (firm 1) to 20.4% for the highest peer exposure risk (firm 10).
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These findings suggest that a high exposure risk can restrain firms’ ability to eﬃciently
identify and compose optimal peer groups for the purpose of RPE. If precise information
on the theoretical distributions of e0 on e is lacking, firms need to assess the potential
relation between their own performance and the performance of potential peers by means
of a regression analysis similar to the model used in table 4. The low number of significant
regression coeﬃcients for peer firms with a suﬃciently high exposure risk indicates that this
procedure bears the risk of failing to identify the relevant set of peer firms. Moreover, since
the weights of individual peer firms are determined simultaneously, the failure to identify a
subset of relevant performance peers will necessarily bias the weights put on the peer firms
that are properly identified.
6.3 Firm sample analysis
The firm level regressions in panel C of table 1 and table 2 indicate that the presence of
exposure risk can cause a type II error in RPE tests performed at the firm-level and lead to
the wrong conclusion that firms reward executives for observable luck despite the fact that
they actually use the appropriate filtering rules defined in (12) or (16), respectively. To see
if the observations made at the firm level can be confirmed for a larger firm sample, as it is
typically considered in empirical tests for the use of RPE, I repeat the test from panel C of
table 1 with a simulated data set of 100 firms and 1,000 observations per firm.
[please insert table 5 about here]
To isolate the consequences of a varying exposure risk from other economic variables,
all sample firms have the same performance structure and apply the optimal filtering rule
defined in (12), but they diﬀer in the variance of their exposure to common risk. Panel A of
table 5 shows the distribution of  the standard deviation of firm ’s exposure to common
risk. I consider four diﬀerent scenarios. The first scenario serves as a benchmark case and
considers a constant exposure to common risk ( = 0) In the other three scenarios,  is
drawn once at the beginning of the simulation study from the uniform distributions given
in the first row of panel A. In a second step, the firm specific value of  is used to generate
the firms’ period  exposure to common risk by a draw from a normally distributed random
variable with [e] = 1 and  [e] = 2 
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Panel B of table 5 reports the results from 1,000 simulated pooled regressions of the
optimally aggregated performance measure  =  − [e] ·  on the common risk factor
 for the randomly generated firm sample. The results are consistent with the firm level
analysis and indicate that an increasing level of exposure risk in the firm sample increases
the likelihood of a type II error in an empirical RPE test. In the simulation study, the
fraction of firms that appear to reward their executives for luck despite the fact that all
firms removed the expected contribution of the common risk factor from their performance
measure, ranges between 9.3 % for the lowest exposure risk (case 2) and 13.9 % for the
highest exposure risk considered in the simulation (case 4). As in the firm level analysis,
these values are significantly higher than for a constant exposure (case 1) with a 5.8% share
of significant regression coeﬃcients at the 95 % level.
These results raise the question of whether and how empirical RPE studies could poten-
tially exploit the firm level diﬀerences in the variance of the exposure to common risk in order
to reduce the likelihood of a type II error. In this study, I consider two options for achieving
this objective and evaluate their eﬀectiveness by additional simulation analyses. The first
option is the use of a proxy for the firm-specific exposure risk in the regression equation.
Provided that the distribution of the firms’ exposure to common risk is constant over time,
such a measure could be derived from a sequence of firm-level regressions of realized firm
performance  on the common risk factor  for diﬀerent time windows. The second option
is the use of a regression method that accounts for the heterogeneity in the randomness of
the firm’s exposure to common risk. The method of choice is a random coeﬃcients model be-
cause it explicitly estimates firm specific regression coeﬃcients and thereby allows to control
for firm-specific diﬀerences in the volatility of the exposure to common risk.13
[please insert table 6 about here]
Table 6 presents the results of the first test. To construct an informative measure of the
firm-specific exposures risk, I first draw the standard deviation of each firm’s exposure risk
from a uniform distribution on [0 2] as in the intermediate case 3 of table 5. In a second
13Random coeﬃcients models are rarely used in empirical compensation research, an exception is Hermalin
and Wallace (2001). Most RPE studies use pooled or firm-fixed eﬀects regression models. In the current
setting, both estimation methods are supposed to yield the same results because e and e are independent
(Greene 2008, p.183).
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step, I generate a noisy signal e of  by adding a normally distributed noise term e with
zero mean and  [e] = 2  Third, I construct a dummy variable to control for a high
exposure risk in the regression equation. The dummy takes the value of 1 if the realized
signal value  is above the sample mean of all firms’ signal realizations.
To allow for diﬀerent signal qualities, I analyze four diﬀerent cases by gradually varying
the standard deviation of the noise term e between 0 and 3 as shown in panel A of table
6. Panel B summarizes the main results from 1,000 pooled regressions with a proxy for the
magnitude of the firm’s exposure risk. The key statistic for determining the likelihood of
a type II error is the percentage of significant regression coeﬃcients at the 95 % level for
the common risk factor (b1) With shares of 1.1 % for case 1 ( = 0) and 6.9% for case 2
( = 1), these shares are significantly lower than the share of 12.7 % found in the relevant
case 3 of the univariate regression in table 5.
These findings indicate that a suﬃciently precise proxy variable for the magnitude of the
firms’ exposure risk can help to reduce the likelihood of a type II error in an empirical RPE
test. It can also bee seen that the share of significant regression coeﬃcients for the interaction
term (b2) is of the same order of magnitude as in the univariate regression regardless of the
signal precision. This observation shows that the likelihood of the type II error is mainly
driven by firms with an exposure risk above the sample average.
[please insert table 7 about here]
Table 7 shows the results of the second test. The setup and the data used for the simula-
tion are the same as for the pooled regression in table 5. Panel B reports the distribution of
the regression coeﬃcients found in the simulation of the random coeﬃcients model. While
the distribution of the regression coeﬃcients is similar to the results found in the pooled
regression in table 5, the share of significant regression coeﬃcients at the 95 % level is sig-
nificantly lower than the lowest share of 5.8 % found in the pooled regression model for a
constant exposure to the common risk factor. Moreover, the share of significant regression
coeﬃcients takes values between 0.5% and 0.3% regardless of the magnitude of the exposure
risk found in the firm sample. These results indicate that the random coeﬃcients model is
an appropriate method for reducing the likelihood of a type II error even for significant levels
of exposure risk because it decomposes the regression coeﬃcients into a general and a firm-
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specific component and thereby provides an indirect control for the firm-specific variations
of the exposure to common risk.
7 Summary and suggestions for future research
I study the consequences of a random exposure to common risk for the purpose of relative
performance evaluation (RPE). I find that a random exposure to commons risk can have
important consequences for the usefulness and the empirical measurement of RPE. On the
one hand, the magnitude of the exposure risk determines how firms aggregate measures of
common risk with measures of firm performance. On the other hand, the exposure risk
contained in measures of common risk determines the eﬀectiveness of these measures in
controlling the impact of common risk on measures of firm performance. As a consequence,
the random exposure to common risk can significantly limit the usefulness of RPE.
To explore how varying degrees of exposure risk aﬀect the statistical identification of rel-
evant common risk measures, I complement my theoretical analysis by two sets of regression
models with randomly generated observations. In the first set of regressions, I find that an
increasing exposure risk impairs the firms’ ability to determine the relevant set of perfor-
mance measures and peer firms. Since the weights of individual peer firms are determined
simultaneously, the failure to identify a subset of relevant performance peers also biases the
weights put on properly identified peers.
In a second set of simulated regressions, I examine how the random exposure to common
risk aﬀects the empirical identification of RPE. I find that a high exposure risk increases
the likelihood of a type II error in implicit RPE tests. To address this problem, I examine
two empirical strategies to control for the magnitude of the exposure risk. In the first test,
I use a dummy variable identifying firms with a high exposure risk. In the second test, I
use a random coeﬃcient regression model as an indirect control for exposure risk. While the
second method significantly reduces the likelihood of a type II error even for a high exposure
risk, the first method performs well only if the firm level measure of exposure risk is not too
noisy. These results suggest that the power of implicit RPE tests could be improved by the
use of appropriate controls for the magnitude of exposure risk at the firm level. Even though
the SEC’s new disclosure requirements now permit the use of disclosed peers firms in direct
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tests of RPE (Gong et al. 2011), the refinement of indirect test methods is still a relevant
issue for empirical research that seeks to study peer weights or the exposure to non-disclosed
common risk factors.
Overall, my analysis suggests that the randomness of firms’ exposure to common risk can
be an important factor in determining whether or not and how firms practice RPE. Future
empirical studies could measure the exposure risk implied by various risk factors and analyze
its importance for the explicit use of RPE, the choice of peer firms or changes of peer groups
over time and thereby provide evidence for the empirical relevance of exposure risk for the
practice of RPE.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Part 1: The BLP is found by minimizing the mean squared error
 = [(e0 − 0 − β0ey)2] (23)
with respect to 0 and β Rearranging terms
 = 20 − 2 · 0 · ([e0]− β0[ey]) +[(e0 − β0ey)2] (24)
and taking the derivative w.r.t. 0 yields
∗0 = [e0]− β0[ey] (25)
Substituting for 0 from (25) into (24) yields
 = [(e0 − β0ey)2]− ([e0]− β0[ey])2 (26)
=  [e0 − β0ey)]
=  [e0] + β0Vβ−2β0d
Taking the first derivative of the last expression in (26) yields the system of first order
conditions
Vβ = d (27)
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The solution of this system is given in (11).
Part 2a: To reproduce the result in (8), note that for  = 1β =1V = [e1] and
d = [e0 e1] It follows that
1 =  [e0 e1] [e1] 
Part 2b: Since (10) is a generalization of (9), it suﬃces to verify that (10) is a special case
of (11). Let e0 and e have the structure given in (1) and let  be a firm specific constant.
It follows that
 [e] = 2 ·  [e] +  [e]
 [e e] =  ·  ·  [e]
 [e0 e] = 0 ·  ·  [e]
With this structure, the equation system in (27) takes the form
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
21 ·  [e] +  [e1]  1 ·  ·  [e]
...
. . .
...
1 ·  ·  [e] · · · 2 ·  [e] +  [e]
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1
...

⎞
⎟⎟⎠=
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0 · 1 ·  [e]
...
0 ·  ·  [e]
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ 
dividing each row of this system by 0 ·  ·  [e] yields the simplified system
Hβ = 1 (28)
where 1 is the n× 1 ones vector,
H =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 + 1  
...
. . .
...
1 · · ·  + 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ (29)
and
 = 0   =
 [e]
0 ·  ·  [e] = 10 ·  ·   ·  [e]  (30)
Applying Cramer’s rule, yields the solution
 = |Hi||H| =
Q
=1 6= Q
=1  +
P
=1  ·
Q
=1 6=   (31)
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where Hi is the matrix H with the -th column replaced by the ones vector 1. From (31)
and the fact that  =  ·  the ratio of any two peer weights in (7) equals

 =

 =
 ·  
 ·   (32)
Solving (32) for all  and substituting the resulting expression for all  6=  into the index
equation P
=1  = 1
yields the aggregation rule in (10). Setting  = 1 for all  yields Holmstrom’s aggregation
rule in equation (9).
Proof of Corollary 1
The optimal solution of the agency problem solves the following maximization problem:
max  = [e0]−[(e0)] (33)
  = [(e0)]− () ·  [(e0)] ≥  (34)

0 =
[(e0)]
0 − (0) = 0 (35)
where
[e0] = 0 +[e0] ·[e]
[(e0)] = 0 + 0 · ([e0]−  · [e])
 [(e0)] = 20 ·  [e0] = 20 · ( [e0] + 2 [e]− 2 ·  ·  [e0 e])
Let  denote the Lagrangian of the principal’s constrained maximization problem and let
 be the multiplier of the participation constraint in (34). Taking the derivatives of  with
respect to 0 and  yields:

0 = −1 +  = 0 (36)

 = −0(1− ) +  · () · 
2
0 ·
 [e0]
 = 0 (37)
It follows that  is set so that the variance of the agent’s pay is minimized. This solution
is independent of the optimal incentive rate 0 An analogous result can be found if the
performance measure explicitly aggregates multiple peers into a performance index and takes
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the form e0 = e0 − β0ey Taking into account that  = 1 the optimal aggregation rule for
this case must satisfy 
β =
 [e0]
β = 0 (38)
The condition in (38) is equivalent to the optimality condition for the BLP in (27) and
solved by (11) because essentially, the MSE criterion minimizes  [e0] =  [e0−β0ey)]
Proof of Proposition 3
As shown in the proof of proposition 1, the BLP for a single performance signal is given by
(8). Since e0eand e are mutually independent, the covariance between e and e equals:
 [e e] = [e0] ·[e] ·  [e]
From (3), the variance of e equals
 [e] =  (e) +[e]2 ·  [e] +
where  is the exposure risk as defined in (4)
 =  [e] · ( [e] +[e]2)
With this structure, the optimal aggregation rule becomes
◦ = [e0] · [e] ·  [e] (e) +[e]2 ·  [e] +  (39)
It holds that
◦
 =
◦
 (e) = − [e e] [e]2  0 (40)
◦
 [e] = ( [e] +[e]2) · 
◦
  0 (41)
◦
 [e] = [e0] ·[e] · ( (e) +  [e] ·[e]2) [e]2  0 (42)
◦
[e0] = [e] ·  [e] [e]  0 (43)
◦
[e] = [e0] ·  [e] [e]2 ·∆ (44)
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where ∆ in (44) is given by the expression
∆ =  −[e]2 ·  [e] (45)
The expression in (45) can be positive or negative. It is strictly positive if   [e]2· [e]
where  =  (e) +  is the sum of the idiosyncratic risk  (e) and the exposure
risk  contained in the performance measure e as defined in (4).
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of proposition 4 is similar to the second part of the proof of proposition 1. In the
presence of exposure risk, the elements of the covariance matrix V and the covariance vector
d in (27) become:
 [e] =  (e) +[e]2 ·  [e] +
 [e e] = [e] ·[e] ·  [e]
 [e0 e] = [e0] · [e] ·  [e]
where  =  [e] · ( [e] + [e]2) is the exposure risk embedded in e With these
definitions, the matrix H in (29) that determines the solution of the modified system in (28)
has entries
 = [][0]   =
 [e] +
[e0] ·[e] ·  [e]  (46)
Now, let
() = 1 =
1
 [e] + (47)
where  is the sum of the idiosyncratic risk  [e] and the exposure risk  embedded ine as defined in equation (4). It follows that

 =

 =

 =
[] · ()
[] · ()  (48)
Solving (48) for all  and substituting the resulting expression for all  6=  into the index
equation
P
=1  = 1 yields the aggregation rule
+ = [e] · ()P
=1[e] · () (49)
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1) It holds that
+
 =
[e] ·P=1 6= [e] · 
(
P
=1[e] · )2  0 (50)
+
[e] =  ·
P
=1 6= [e] · 
(
P
=1[e] · )2  0 (51)
and, for any peer with  6= 
+
 = −
 · [e] ·[e]
(
P
=1[e] · )2  0
+
[e] = −  · [e] · (P=1[e] · )2  0
2) Since () = 1 [ ]+  it holds that
()
 = −
1
( [e] +)2  
+
 =
+

()
  0
Moreover,
lim→∞
+ = lim→∞
[e]
[e] + ( [e] +) ·P=1 6= [e] ·  = 0
Proof of Corollary 5
Plugging the definitions from (46) into (31) yields
+ = [e0] ·  [e] · [e] · ()1 +  [e] ·P=1[]2 · ()  (52)
Using the result in (49), the optimal index weight becomes
+ = 
+

+ =
[e0] ·  [e] ·P=1[e] · ()
1 +  [e] ·P=1[]2 · ()  (53)
Substituting the expressions for + and + into the  [e0] yields (21). The expression in
(21) is increasing in + because ++  0
The limits of the scaling factor are determined as follows:
1) Since + =  [e] ·P=1[e]2 · ()  0 it must be that +  1
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2) To show that +  ◦ recall first from (18) that
◦ =  [e] · [e]2 [e] =  [e] · [e]2 [e] +  [e] · []2 +  (54)
using the definition of () and rearranging terms yields
◦ = 
◦
1 + ◦  (55)
where ◦ =  [e] ·[e]2 · () If firm  is part of the index, it must be that
[e]2 · () P=1[e]2 · ()
It follows that +  ◦ and that +  ◦
3) Using the expressions in (14), (18), and (21), the range of + implies that
 [e0(◦)]   [e0(+)]   [e0(∗)]
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Table 1 
PANEL A shows the relevant parameters used for simulating firm performance 𝑥𝑥�0 = 𝑘𝑘0 + ?̃?𝑐0 ∙ 𝜂𝜂� + 𝜀𝜀0̃ and common 
risk 𝜂𝜂�. For each regression 1,000 observations were randomly generated for each variable using the parameter 
𝑘𝑘0 = 1 and independent random numbers generated from the distributions: 𝜂𝜂� ∼ N(1,1), ?̃?𝑐0  ∼ N(1,σ02), 𝜀𝜀0̃ ∼ N(0,1). 
PANEL B presents the summary statistics of 1,000 estimations of the regression model 𝑥𝑥0𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 ∙ 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 using 
simulated data for the 6 parameter sets and random numbers as defined in PANEL A.  
PANEL C presents the summary statistics of 1,000 estimations of the regression model 𝑧𝑧0𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 ∙ 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 where 
𝑧𝑧0𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥0𝑖𝑖 − 𝐸𝐸[?̃?𝑐0] ∙ 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 and 𝐸𝐸[?̃?𝑐0] = 1. All regressions are estimates using the same data as for the regressions 
displayed in PANEL B.  
 
PANEL A: Parameters for the standard deviation of ?̃?𝑐0 used for simulating firm performance 
 Regression model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝜎𝜎0  0 1 3 6 9 12 
PANEL B: Simulated regressions of unfiltered firm performance on common risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk exposure (𝑎𝑎�1)       
Mean 1.0002 0.9976 1.0015 0.9939 0.9978 0.9964 
Standard deviation 0.0320 0.0723 0.1935 0.3661 0.5756 0.7686 
Min 0.8914 0.7770 0.2502 -0.1868 -1.2238 -1.2425 
Max 1.0888 1.2850 1.5708 2.0242 2.6055 3.9774 
t-values       
Mean 31.6062 18.1978 7.2833 3.6846 2.4794 1.8576 
Standard deviation 1.4744 1.4583 1.4370 1.3667 1.4321 1.4405 
Share of 𝑎𝑎�1-coefficients 
significant at 95%-level 100% 100% 99.9% 88.6% 62.8% 46.6% 
R-squared       
Mean 0.4997 0.2492 0.0520 0.0151 0.0081 0.0055 
Standard deviation 0.0234 0.0298 0.0188 0.0100 0.0073 0.0061 
Observations 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
PANEL C: Simulated regressions of filtered firm performance on common risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk exposure (𝑏𝑏�1)       
Mean 0.0002 -0.0024 0.0015 -0.0061 -0.0022 -0.0036 
Standard deviation 0.0320 0.0723 0.1935 0.3661 0.5756 0.7686 
Min -0.1086 -0.2230 -0.7498 -1.1868 -2.2238 -2.2425 
Max 0.0888 0.2850 0.5708 1.0242 1.6055 2.9774 
t-values       
Mean 0.0080 -0.0435 0.0116 -0.0204 -0.0052 -0.0039 
Standard deviation 1.0097 1.3180 1.4055 1.3526 1.4283 1.4350 
Share of 𝑏𝑏�1-coefficients 
significant at 95%-level 5.7% 14.3% 17.5% 14.9% 17.0% 18.2% 
R-squared       
Mean 0.0010 0.0017 0.0020 0.0018 0.0020 0.0020 
Standard deviation 0.0014 0.0025 0.0027 0.0025 0.0027 0.0029 
Observations 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
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Table 2 
PANEL A shows the relevant parameters used for simulating firm performance 𝑥𝑥�0 = 𝑘𝑘0 + ?̃?𝑐0 ∙ 𝜂𝜂� + 𝜀𝜀0̃ and a noisy 
measure of common risk 𝑦𝑦� = 𝑘𝑘1 + ?̃?𝑐1 ∙ 𝜂𝜂� + 𝜀𝜀1̃. For each regression 1,000 observations were randomly generated for 
each variable using independent random numbers generated from the distributions 𝜂𝜂� ∼ N(1,1), 𝜀𝜀0̃, 𝜀𝜀1̃ ∼ N(0,1), 
?̃?𝑐0  ∼ N(1,1), ?̃?𝑐1  ∼ N(1,σ12) with parameters 𝑘𝑘0 = 𝑘𝑘1 = 1, and the values for 𝜎𝜎1 given below. 
PANEL B presents the summary statistics of 1,000 estimations of the regression model 𝑥𝑥0𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 ∙ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 using 
simulated data for the 6 parameter sets and random numbers as defined in PANEL A.  
PANEL C presents the summary statistics of 1,000 estimations of the regression model 𝑧𝑧0𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 ∙ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 where 
𝑧𝑧0𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥0𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼° ∙ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  where 𝛼𝛼° is the optimal weight of 𝑦𝑦� as defined in equation (16).  
 
PANEL A: Parameters for the standard deviation of ?̃?𝑐1 used for simulating the noisy signal of common risk 
 Regression model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝜎𝜎1  0 1 3 6 9 12 
PANEL B: Simulated regressions of unfiltered firm performance on noisy signal of common risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk exposure (𝑎𝑎�1)       
Mean 0.5032 0.2500 0.0507 0.0142 0.0060 0.0036 
Standard deviation 0.0465 0.0373 0.0205 0.0102 0.0069 0.0052 
Min 0.3613 0.1226 -0.0190 -0.0230 -0.0153 -0.0127 
Max 0.6494 0.3779 0.1179 0.0449 0.0298 0.0181 
t-values       
Mean 12.0299 8.1555 3.6105 1.9425 1.2143 0.9715 
Standard deviation 1.1301 1.2623 1.4693 1.3878 1.4016 1.3928 
Share of 𝑎𝑎�1-coefficients 
significant at 95%-level 100.0% 100.0% 87.2% 49.8% 30.8% 26.2% 
R-squared       
Mean 0.1271 0.0635 0.0149 0.0056 0.0034 0.0029 
Standard deviation 0.0207 0.0182 0.0106 0.0059 0.0042 0.0035 
Observations 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
PANEL C: Simulated regressions of filtered firm performance on noisy signal of common risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk exposure (𝑏𝑏�1)       
Mean 0.0032 0.0000 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0002 
Standard deviation 0.0465 0.0373 0.0205 0.0102 0.0069 0.0052 
Min -0.1387 -0.1274 -0.0690 -0.0365 -0.0214 -0.0161 
Max 0.1494 0.1279 0.0679 0.0314 0.0237 0.0147 
t-values       
Mean 0.0711 0.0013 0.0453 0.0974 -0.0210 0.0410 
Standard deviation 1.1116 1.2188 1.4624 1.3869 1.3986 1.3935 
Share of 𝑏𝑏�1-coefficients 
significant at 95%-level 8.3% 10.3% 18.1% 15.8% 15.7% 16.6% 
R-squared       
Mean 0.0012 0.0015 0.0021 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 
Standard deviation 0.0018 0.0021 0.0030 0.0028 0.0027 0.0026 
Observations 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
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Table 3 
The table presents the exposure risk Rj, optimal peer weights γ𝑗𝑗+ and the index weight α+ as defined in equations (4), (19), and (20) for the peer index 𝑦𝑦 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗10𝑗𝑗=1  for a 
set of 10 peer firms with firm performance 𝑥𝑥�𝑗𝑗 = 𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 + ?̃?𝑐𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝜂𝜂� + 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑗 and a focal firm with performance 𝑥𝑥�0 = 𝑘𝑘0 + ?̃?𝑐0 ∙ 𝜂𝜂� + 𝜀𝜀0̃. The solutions are determined assuming the 
probability distributions 𝜂𝜂� ∼ N(1,1), 𝜀𝜀0̃, 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑗 ∼ N(0,1), ?̃?𝑐0  ∼ N(1,1), ?̃?𝑐𝑗𝑗  ∼ N�1,σ𝑗𝑗2� with parameter values 𝑘𝑘0 = 𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 = 1, and 𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗 = 𝑗𝑗 for j=1,…,10. The second set of 
entries compares the results to the same set of peers in the absence of exposure risk, i.e. 𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗 = 0 for j=1,…,10.  
Table 3: Aggregation of peer groups with and without exposure risk  
  Peer firm /𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
RPE with exposure risk          
 
Exposure risk (Rj) 2 8 18 32 50 72 98 128 162 200 
Peer weight (γ𝑗𝑗+) 0.5653 0.1884 0.0893 0.0514 0.0333 0.0232 0.0171 0.0131 0.0104 0.0084 
Index weight (α+) 0.3709          
Effective weight (γ𝑗𝑗+ ∙ α+) 0.2097 0.0699 0.0331 0.0191 0.0123 0.0086 0.0064 0.0049 0.0039 0.0031 
RPE absent exposure risk           
Peer weight (γ𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Index weight (α𝑛𝑛) 0.7273          
Effective weight (γ𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛 ∙ α𝑛𝑛) 0.0727 0.0727 0.0727 0.0727 0.0727 0.0727 0.0727 0.0727 0.0727 0.0727 
% Differences           (γ𝑗𝑗+ − γ𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛)/γ𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛 465.31% 88.44% -10.74% -48.61% -66.75% -76.77% -82.87% -86.85% -89.60% -91.56% (α+ − α𝑛𝑛)/α𝑛𝑛 -49.00%          
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Table 4 
The table presents the summary statistics of 1,000 estimations of the multiple regression model 𝑥𝑥0𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖10𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 using simulated data for focal firm 
performance 𝑥𝑥�0 = 𝑘𝑘0 + ?̃?𝑐0 ∙ 𝜂𝜂� + 𝜀𝜀0̃ and peer performance 𝑥𝑥�𝑗𝑗 = 𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 + ?̃?𝑐𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝜂𝜂� + 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑗 for peer firm j , j = 1,…,10.. For each regression 1’000 observations for each variable 
were randomly generated using independent random numbers generated from the distributions 𝜂𝜂� ∼ N(1,1), 𝜀𝜀0̃, 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑗 ∼ N(0,1), ?̃?𝑐0  ∼ N(1,1), ?̃?𝑐𝑗𝑗  ∼ N�1,σ𝑗𝑗2� with parameters 
𝑘𝑘0 = 𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 = 1, and 𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗 = 𝑗𝑗 for j = 1,…,10. 
 
Table 4: Simulated regression of focal firm performance on peer performance 
  Peer firm /𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Firm to peer performance 
exposure (𝑎𝑎�𝑗𝑗)           
Mean 0.2069 0.0716 0.0327 0.0196 0.0127 0.0089 0.0066 0.0046 0.0038 0.0028 
Standard deviation 0.0406 0.0276 0.0193 0.0147 0.0115 0.0096 0.0085 0.0073 0.0067 0.0060 
Min 0.0742 -0.0231 -0.0209 -0.0238 -0.0253 -0.0252 -0.0249 -0.0201 -0.0162 -0.0200 
Max 0.3297 0.1559 0.1025 0.0730 0.0458 0.0472 0.0350 0.0283 0.0271 0.0221 
t-values           
Mean 6.6597 3.6747 2.3908 1.8763 1.5031 1.2638 1.0772 0.8587 0.8084 0.6626 
Standard deviation 1.3257 1.4228 1.4086 1.4070 1.3587 1.3664 1.3945 1.3744 1.3998 1.3935 
Share of 𝑎𝑎�𝑗𝑗-coefficients 
significant at 95%-level 100.0% 88.0% 62.2% 47.7% 37.0% 31.8% 28.4% 22.1% 22.7% 20.4% 
Adjusted R-squared           
Mean 0.0997          
Standard deviation 0.0236          
Observations 1,000          
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Table 5: Simulation of pooled regression for a firm sample 
PANEL A shows the relevant parameters used for simulating firm performance 𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑘𝑘 + ?̃?𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝜂𝜂�𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑖𝑖 and exposure 
to common risk 𝜂𝜂�𝑖𝑖. For each regression a sample of 100 firms with 1,000 observations per firm was randomly 
generated using the parameter 𝑘𝑘 = 1 and independent random numbers generated from the distributions 𝜂𝜂�𝑖𝑖 ∼N(1,1), ?̃?𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ∼ N(1,σ𝑖𝑖2), and 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∼ N(0,1). The firm specific standard deviations of the exposure to common risk, 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖, 
were drawn once from the uniform distributions given in the first row of PANEL A at the beginning of the 
simulation study. 
PANEL B presents the summary statistics of 1,000 estimations of the regression model 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 ∙ 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐸𝐸[?̃?𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] ∙ 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 and 𝐸𝐸[?̃?𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] = 1. 
 
PANEL A: Parameter distribution for the standard deviation of ?̃?𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  used for simulating firm performance 
  Regression model   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Distribution of 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 - U[0, 1] U[0, 2] U[0, 3] 
Sample Mean 0 0.5007 1.0014 1.5021 
Sample standard deviation 0 0.2873 0.5746 0.8619 
Number of Firms 100 100 100 100 
Observations per firm 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
PANEL B: Simulated regressions of filtered firm performance on noisy signal of common risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risk exposure(𝑏𝑏�1)     
Mean 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
Standard deviation 0.0032 0.0047 0.0078 0.0112 
Min -0.0106 -0.0156 -0.0307 -0.0458 
Max 0.0099 0.0155 0.0238 0.0344 
t-values     
Mean -0.0039 0.0255 0.0318 0.0336 
Standard deviation 1.0060 1.1523 1.2793 1.3286 
Share of 𝑏𝑏�1-coefficients 
significant at 95%-level 5.80% 9.30% 12.70% 13.90% 
R-squared     
Mean 0.000010 0.000013 0.000016 0.000018 
Standard deviation 0.000014 0.000018 0.000023 0.000025 
Observations 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
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Table 6: Simulation of pooled regression for a firm sample with proxy for exposure risk 
PANEL A shows the relevant parameters used for simulating firm performance 𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑘𝑘 + ?̃?𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝜂𝜂�𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑖𝑖 and exposure 
to common risk 𝜂𝜂�𝑖𝑖. For each regression a sample of 100 firms with 1,000 observations per firm were randomly 
generated using the parameter 𝑘𝑘 = 1 and independent random numbers generated from the distributions: 𝜂𝜂�𝑖𝑖 ∼N(1,1), ?̃?𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ∼ N(1,σ𝑖𝑖2), and 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∼ N(0,1). The firm specific standard deviations of the exposure to common risk, 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖, 
was drawn once from a uniform distribution on [0,2] as in regression model 3 in Table 5 at the beginning of the 
simulation study. 
PANEL B presents the summary statistics of 1,000 estimations of the regression model  
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 ∙ 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝑑𝑑 + 𝑏𝑏2 ∙ 𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 where 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐸𝐸[?̃?𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] ∙ 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, 𝐸𝐸[?̃?𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] = 1, and d is a dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 if the signal 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖 = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖̃ takes a value above the sample mean of all signal realizations. The noise term 
in 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖 is randomly drawn from N(0,σ𝜖𝜖2) with the standard deviations given in PANEL A. 
 
PANEL A: Parameters used for the standard deviation of the noise term in the signal  𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖 
  Regression model   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖 0 1 2 3 
PANEL B: Simulated regressions of filtered firm performance on noisy signal of common risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risk exposure (𝑏𝑏�1)     
Mean -0.0002 0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0003 
Standard deviation 0.0220 0.0297 0.0340 0.0339 
Min -0.0997 -0.1032 -0.1114 -0.1085 
Max 0.0670 0.0985 0.1120 0.1015 
t-values     
Mean -0.0090 0.0303 -0.0237 -0.0105 
Standard deviation 0.7984 1.0827 1.2440 1.2488 
     
Risk exposure × risk 
exposure above mean(𝑏𝑏�2)     
Mean 0.0001 -0.0019 0.0008 0.0002 
Standard deviation 0.0501 0.0510 0.0528 0.0509 
Min -0.1590 -0.1735 -0.1712 -0.1665 
Max 0.1769 0.1659 0.1806 0.1342 
t-values     
Mean 0.0028 -0.0512 0.0208 0.0046 
Standard deviation 1.2974 1.3143 1.3711 1.3260 
Share of 𝑏𝑏�1-coefficients 
significant at 95%-level 1.10% 6.90% 11.20% 11.80% 
Share of 𝑏𝑏�2-coefficients 
significant at 95%-level 13.60% 13.90% 14.80% 13.10% 
R-squared     
Mean 0.000452 0.000455 0.000468 0.000452 
Standard deviation 0.000488 0.000434 0.000450 0.000420 
Observations 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
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Table 7: Simulation of random coefficients regression for a firm sample 
PANEL A shows the relevant parameters used for simulating firm performance 𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑘𝑘 + ?̃?𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝜂𝜂�𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑖𝑖 and exposure 
to common risk 𝜂𝜂�𝑖𝑖. For each regression a sample of 100 firms with 1,000 observations per firm was randomly 
generated using the parameter 𝑘𝑘 = 1 and independent random numbers generated from the distributions 𝜂𝜂�𝑖𝑖 ∼N(1,1), ?̃?𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ∼ N(1,σ𝑖𝑖2), and 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∼ N(0,1). The firm specific standard deviations of the exposure to common risk, 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖, 
were drawn once from the uniform distributions given in the first row of PANEL A at the beginning of the 
simulation study. 
PANEL B presents the summary statistics of 1,000 estimations of the random coefficients regression model  
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑏0𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 where 𝑏𝑏1𝑖𝑖  = 𝑏𝑏1 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 , 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐸𝐸[?̃?𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] ∙ 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, and 𝐸𝐸[?̃?𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] = 1. 
 
PANEL A: Parameter distribution for the standard deviation of ?̃?𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  used for simulating firm performance 
  Regression model   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial Distribution of 𝜎𝜎0 - U[0, 1] U[0, 2] U[0, 3] 
Sample Mean 0 0.5007 1.0014 1.5021 
Sample standard deviation 0 0.2873 0.5746 0.8619 
Number of Firms 100 100 100 100 
Observations per firm 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
PANEL B: Simulated regressions of filtered firm performance on noisy signal of common risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Common component of 
risk exposure (𝑏𝑏�1)     
Mean 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 
Standard deviation 0.0032 0.0045 0.0068 0.0094 
Min -0.0106 -0.0149 -0.0277 -0.0405 
Max 0.0097 0.0142 0.0209 0.0293 
z-values     
Mean -0.0025 0.0185 0.0214 0.0217 
Standard deviation 0.7121 0.7149 0.7023 0.6947 
Share of 𝑏𝑏�1-coefficients 
significant at 95%-level 0.50% 0.40% 0.30% 0.40% 
Observations 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
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